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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

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(b)(1) (b)(3) THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

6 November 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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THE SITUATION IN CUBA

About half of the missile transporters and launching equipment previously identified at the MRBM sites now have appeared in Cuban ports.

Preliminary analysis of 5 November photography shows to 9 of the 11 MRBM missile transporters at the port of Mariel have been loaded on the decks of Soviet ships in the harbor, and one of the ships is apparently leaving port. Woscow thus appears to be shipping missiles from Cuba without waiting for ships capable of carrying them below deck.

All six of the IRBM launch rings previously observed are now at dock-side, according to photography of 4 November. Coverage of the known IRBM and MRBM sites confirms that they are being abandoned. Some trucks and tents remain at several sites.

Some MRBM equipment, including 12 missile transporters, has been seen near the port of Casilda, which is on the southern coast of Cuba near Trinidad. Casilda was not identified as a port of entry for MRBM equipment during the missile build-up in Cuba, and it does not appear to be a logical port for the removal of equipment from the known offensive missile sites, none of which are in this area.

The 4 November photography revealed no evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba. No unusual security measures which would be suggestive of warheads or nosecones were noted at any port facilities.

All the SAM sites covered in the 4 November photography are believed to be still operational: there is no evidence of preparations to abandon them.

There is also no evidence of any intention to withdraw Soviet II-28 jet light bombers from Cuba. Low level photography revealed the presence on 4 November of 9 of these aircraft and fuselage crates for an additional 20 at San Julian airfield in Pinar del Rio Province. It also disclosed 9 II-28 fuselage crates at Holguin airfield in Oriente Province. These are almost certainly those observed on the Soviet vessel Leninsky Komsomol before it docked at a Cuban port near Holguin on 20 October. Together with the four fuselage crates observed at a transshipment point near San Julian, the newly identified crates boost to 42 the number of II-28 aircraft known to be in Cuba.

Holguin airfield, which was enlarged earlier this year, is apparently becoming an operational air force installation. Messages ordering resumption of civil air operations said no use of Holguin would be permitted until further notice.

Cuban propaganda media on 5 November continued to reflect a lack of information on the status of talks between Cuban leaders and Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan, Some clue as to the progress of these talks or on any changes in the attitude of Castro regime officials towards the USSR may be given tonight by veteran Cuban Communist leader and agarian reform chief Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who is to deliver the keynote speech at a public commemoration of the October Revolution.



BLOC-CUBA

Moscow is not reporting any details on Mikoyan's Cuban talks. Apparently the Soviet leader expects to remain in Hayana at least until Saturday.

Bloc spokesmen continue to emphasize the line that Soviet actions during the Cuban crisis saved world peace. The advance text of Soviet Party Presidium member Kosygin's speech at the Kremlin today on the occasion of the 45th aniversary of the October Revolution notes the President's "solemn declaration" that there would be no invasion of Cuba. Kosygin cites this as justification for withdrawing Soviet missiles from Cuba, since the "presence" of these weapons "lost its purpose." He addresses himself to the question of "who gave in to whom" and responds, "we consider that this was a compromise from both sides, a compromise to common sense and peace."

In line with Moscow's current de-emphasis of the German question, Kosygin pays only lip service to the issue. He asserts that the Soviet peoples want firm guarantees "today, and not after some indefinite period of time," against the repetition of German aggression, but says nothing about a deadline or a separate treaty.

The 5 November <u>Pravda</u> carried an article by Polish leader Gomulka defending the Soviet back-down in Cuba. He claimed that the USSR scored the major achievement of obtaining a US promise not to invade Cuba.


Bulgarian party leader Zhivkov followed the same line at the eighth party congress in Sofia. His speech yesterday drew loud applause, according to a Western press account, but the head of the Chinese Communist delegation sat back silently with folded arms.

In China, the Peiping regime continues to inveigh against any sign of Comm. Inist weakness on Cuba. For the third day running, mass demonstrations were organized throughout the country in support of Castro's "five just demands." Echoing the mainland press, Communist newspapers in Hong Kong are scoring policies of "appeasement." One newspaper indicated its disagreement with "some people" who felt that "Cuba is too small a country to risk a war with the United States."

In its roundup of world reaction to the Cuban crisis, the Chinese Communist party newspaper People's Daily quoted an Albanian article as saying that the world would allow "no repetition of the events in the Congo, nor another Munich intrigue."

SOVIET BLOC MILITARY FORCES

No significant change has been noted in the status of the major bloc military forces.



SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

There now are eight Soviet dry cargo ships, six Soviet tankers and two satellite dry cargo ships bound for Cuban ports. These include the ORKHOUGA and the OKHOUSK, fast Soviet freighters with large hatch openings (76 by 36 feet) capable of carrying ballistic missiles and transporters below deck. Both could arrive in Havana about 19 November.

The third Soviet ship of this class, the OMSK, was scheduled to load ore in Novorossisk on 3 November for a voyage to Japan. It seems likely that this schedule will be followed.